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Abstract: The South China Sea (SCS) airspace is a part of the important 
base supporting China’s management and development of Dongsha, Zhongsha, 
Xisha and Nansha Islands as well as their adjacent waters. China’s entitlement to 
the SCS airspace should include, all the existing and future rights necessary for 
the development of these SCS islands, and for the maintenance of the sovereign 
relations between China’s mainland territory and its indispensable archipelagic 
waters. The freedom of navigation and overflight of other States should be 
without prejudice to China’s exercise of such rights. Currently, the two concepts, 
“aircraft” and “aviation behaviors”, are confused and used interchangeably both 
in the academic and practitioner circles. In addition, studies on the notion of state 
aviation behavior are few. Therefore, there is no clear standard to identify state 
aviation behaviors or state aviation behaviors performed in foreign or international 
airspace. This paper, by collating and examining the existing concepts and defini-
tions, clarifies the differences between “aircraft” and “aviation behavior.” Further, 
it defines the notion of state aviation behavior after reviewing the purpose and 
behavioral attributes of state aircraft. Lastly, the author sorts out the standards 
which can be applied to decide the legality of state aviation behaviors performed in 
foreign and international airspace.
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I. Research Questions
Serving as a strategic passage and energy base, the South China Sea (SCS) 
holds special strategic significance to China, a hybrid country that borders with 
both land and sea.1 Particularly, the current views and opinions about the U-shaped 
line in the SCS are not consistent. There are mainly four different postulations 
regarding the legal status of this line, namely, the “historic waters line”, the 
“historic title line”, “maritime boundary line”, and the “islands ownership line”. In 
accordance with the postulation of “islands ownership line”, China has indisputable 
sovereignty over the Dongsha, Zhongsha, Xisha and Nansha Islands as well as their 
surrounding waters.2 It implies that the SCS islands form an indispensable part of 
China, and the operation of state aircraft, especially those of foreign States, would 
become the focus of worldwide attention.
On the one hand, according to Article 3 of the Convention on International 
Civil Aviation (hereinafter “Chicago Convention”), “[n]o state aircraft of a 
contracting State shall fly over the territory of another State or land thereon without 
authorization by special agreement or otherwise, and in accordance with the terms 
thereof.” On the other hand, China has concluded many bilateral aeronautical 
agreements with other States, allowing the entry of their civil aircrafts to China’s 
airspace. 
Recently, under the pretext of the so-called “freedom of navigation”, many 
attempts have been made to internationalize the SCS issue. However, “freedom 
of navigation” and “freedom of overflight”, primarily, refer to the rights on the 
high seas. In contrast, the U-shaped line is an islands ownership line and resource 
1  　 Du Debin, Fan Fei and Ma Yahua, Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea and China’s 
Strategies, World Regional Studies, Vol. 21, No. 2, 2012, p. 1. (in Chinese)
2　   Li Jinming, The Legal Status of the U-shaped Line in the South China Sea: Historic Waters, 
Maritime Boundary or a Line of Islands Ownership?, Southeast Asian Affairs, No. 4, 2010, 
pp. 22~29 (in Chinese); Li Jinming, Background and Legal Status of the U-shaped Line 
in the South China Sea, Contemporary International Relations, No. 9, 2012, pp. 7~14 (in 
Chinese). Gao Zhiguo, the Director of China Institute for Marine Affairs, SOA, argues that 
the U-shaped line on the Chinese map is merely a line that delineates ownership of islands 
rather than a maritime boundary in the conventional sense. He wrote in an article, “[a] 
careful study of Chinese documents reveals that China never has claimed the entire water 
column of the South China Sea, but only the islands and their surrounding waters within the 
line.”
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jurisdiction line.3 China has special entitlement to the waters enclosed by the 
U-shaped line. Therefore, it is necessary to embark on a discussion on aviation 
behaviors. 
The connotations and denotations of conventional legal concepts, unavoidably, 
will change accordingly with the development of science and technology, especially 
those relating to aviation activities. In this case, a study on the basic concepts 
pertinent to aviation activities is particularly important. 
First, both the Civil Aviation Law of the People’s Republic of China and 
the relevant international conventions, confuse the two concepts of “aircraft” 
and “aviation behavior” and use them interchangeably. For example, Chicago 
Convention, Article 3, entitled “Civil and state aircraft”, defines state aircraft as 
“aircraft used in military, customs and police services”.4 The expression “aircraft 
used in military, customs and police services”, virtually, is employed to describe 
“aviation behavior”, which however is conceptualized by using the word “aircraft”. 
This is a misuse of “behavior” for “object”. For this reason, when civil aircraft 
carry out state missions, or state aircraft perform civil tasks, misjudgment often 
occurs in practice. For instance, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) says 
shooting down a drone is a federal crime5 based on Title 18, Section 32 of the 
United States Code.6 This act, obviously, mixes up “object” with “behavior”. 
Second, although much attention has been given to the study of civil aviation 
behavior by scholars and practitioners, few in-depth discussions have been made 
with respect to the definition of state aviation behavior and the criteria to identify 
state aviation behaviors. Lack of such discussions will result in unclear or vague 
concepts. The elucidation of state aviation behavior, a concept most linked to civil 
aviation behavior, would make the scope of the latter clearer, and also contribute 
significantly to the development of the basic concept system concerning aviation 
3  　 Jin Yongming, The Nature of China’s U-shaped Line in the South China Sea and the Legal 
Status of Waters Enclosed by the Line, China Legal Science, No. 6, 2012, pp. 36~48. (in 
Chinese)
4  　 Article 5 of the Civil Aviation Law of the People’s Republic of China also adopts the same 
expression, namely, “Civil aircraft mentioned in this law refer to aircraft other than those 
used for flying mission of military, customs and police operations.”
5 　 FAA Says Shooting Down Drones Is a Federal Crime, at http://www.engadget.
com/2016/04/18/faa-says-shooting-down-drones-is-a-federal-crime/, 22 November 2016.
6  　 18 USC 32: (a) Whoever willfully - (1) sets fire to, damages, destroys, disables, or wrecks 
any aircraft in the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States or any civil aircraft used, 
operated, or employed in interstate, overseas, or foreign air commerce; … shall be fined 
under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years or both. Obviously, this provision 
used the word “aircraft”, without distinguishing aviation behaviors. 
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activities. 
Finally, the majority of the recorded eight incidents, where civil aircraft were 
suspected to be shot down by armed forces, are tragedies caused by misjudging 
civil aviation behaviors as state ones. These tragedies, in nature, are resulted from 
the confusing of civil with state aviation behaviors. When a State’s aircraft, which 
have characteristics of state aviation behavior, enter into the airspace of another 
State, the right of self-defence may be triggered. That is one important reason why 
state aviation behavior urgently needs a careful study.  
Embarking on the nature of aircraft and aviation activities, the author attempts, 
through examining the existing definitions for “act of aggression”, to outline 
the purpose and behavioral attributes of state aircraft, and further to define state 
aviation behavior.
II. The Legal Status of the SCS Airspace: 
      A Perspective from Maritime Rights and Interests
Indisputably, the determination of the nature of airspace is fairly important 
for civil aviation activities. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) 
classified airspace into seven classes: Class A, Class B, Class C, Class D, Class 
E, Class F and Class G.7 Nonetheless, such technical classification of airspace is 
preconditioned on the principal attributes of airspace. In this connection, the legal 
status of the SCS airspace should be decided after first taking into account the 
7 　 1) Class A: IFR flights only are permitted, all flights are separated from each other and 
provided with air traffic control (ATC) service; continuous two-way radio communication 
is mandatory, and all flights are required to follow ATC clearances. 2) Class B: IFR and 
VFR flights are permitted; other requirements are identical with those of Class A. 3) Class 
C: IFR flights are separated from other IFR flights; VFR flights are separated from IFR 
flights; all these flights are provided with ATC service, and other requirements are identical 
with those of Class B. 4) Class D: IFR flights are separated from other IFR flights and are 
provided with ATC service; VFR flights receive traffic information in respect of all other 
flights; and other requirements are identical with those of Class C. 5) Class E: continuous 
two-way radio communication is mandatory for IFR flights; VFR flights are not required 
to follow ATC clearances; and other requirements are identical with those of Class D. 6) 
Class F: IFR flights receive air traffic advisory and information service and VFR flights 
receive flight information service; all flights are not required to follow ATC clearances; and 
other requirements are identical with those of Class E. 7) Class G: flights are not required 
to separated from each other, and all flights are provided with flight information service; 
continuous two-way radio communication is mandatory for IFR flights; flights are not 
required to follow ATC clearances; and other requirements are identical with those of Class 
F.
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status of SCS islands and their adjacent waters. 
A. The Legal Status of the Area Enclosed by 
    the U-shaped Line in the SCS
The Xisha Islands constitutes an integral part of China’s territory. And 
the Chinese government announced the baseline of the territorial sea of Xisha 
Islands in 1996, and the waters extending up to 12 nautical miles from the straight 
baseline is the territorial sea of China. Then there comes the question: How to 
define other parts of the area enclosed by the U-shaped line? Part IV of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (UNCLOS) established a unique 
“archipelagic regime”, however, it failed to provide explicitly whether this regime 
is applicable to non-archipelagic State. 
In light of the relevant legal documents and practice, the author is of the 
opinion: First, China has indisputable sovereignty over the Dongsha, Zhongsha, 
Xisha and Nansha Islands, as well as their adjacent waters.
Second, the archipelagic regime cannot be applied to the SCS area where China 
has special entitlement. The UNCLOS failed to deal with the issues associated with 
the mid-ocean archipelagos of non-archipelagic States, which is an unfortunate 
omission of the convention.8 Chinese territory is mainly made of its mainland, 
which is essentially distinct from the general archipelagic States under Part IV of 
UNCLOS, which defines archipelagic State as “a State constituted wholly by one 
or more archipelagos and may include other islands”. More importantly, China 
is a country which carries out pubic administration and promotes economic and 
cultural development primarily on its mainland. Its demands for land territory are 
closely related to the territory of its islands, which is consistent with the country’s 
overall interests and would facilitate public administration. Such demands turn the 
SCS into an “area where China should have special entitlement”. Therefore, the 
part of the area enclosed by the U-shaped line without fixed baseline of territorial 
sea, should be the area where China should have special entitlement, in view of 
the sovereign relations between China’s mainland territory and its indispensable 
archipelagic waters. 
8  　 Kuen-chen Fu and Zheng Fan, Unity of Archipelago and Freedom of Navigation: Some 
Suggestions on Applying Archipelagic Regime in the South China Sea, Journal of SJTU 
(Philosophy and Social Sciences), Vol. 23, No. 6, 2015, pp. 5~13. (in Chinese)
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Third, the SCS area where China should have special entitlement is an 
indispensable zone for China to sustain the healthy development of its SCS 
islands. As a country which carries out social and economic activities primarily 
on its mainland, China also needs to effectively manage its islands. This is another 
aspect that differentiates China from archipelagic States conducting such activities 
principally on archipelagoes. Compared to its mainland, China’s islands in the SCS 
are still in the primary stage of development, which should be closely connected 
to its mainland. If China’s islands in the SCS are compared to an “infant”, then 
the area enclosed by the U-shaped line can be recognized as a “cradle” nurturing 
the infant. Therefore, being different from its entitlement to the contiguous zone, 
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf, China’s entitlement to the 
special SCS area should include, all the existing and future rights necessary for 
the development of these SCS islands, and for the maintenance of the sovereign 
relations between China’s mainland territory and its indispensable archipelagic 
waters.
Fourth, China’s entitlement to the area enclosed by the U-shaped line in the 
SCS is recognized by the jurisprudence of international law and state practice. 
The Chinese people first discovered, named, developed and utilized the SCS, and 
have effectively managed them for a long term. These historical facts substantiate 
China’s entitlement above. Additionally, China’s entitlement is acknowledged 
by the post-World War II international legal system, including the 1943 Cairo 
Declaration, the 1945 Potsdam Declaration and the 1951 Treaty of San Francisco. 
These facts indicate that China’s entitlement to the SCS islands is distinct from the 
entitlement of other mainland-based States to their islands. 
Lastly, China’s rights over the SCS do not prevent China from “shelving 
disputes and seeking joint development” with other States concerned. In fact, the 
Chinese people have engaged in all kinds of activities in the SCS for over 2,000 
years. Before the late 1960s, when abundant hydrocarbon resources were found in 
the SCS area, the fact that the SCS islands belong to China was widely recognized 
by the international community, and confirmed by diplomatic practice, along 
with authoritative maps and publications of other States. However, after the late 
1960s, the Philippines and other States, one after another, illegally occupied and 
encroached upon more than 40 islands or features of Nansha Islands. China not 
only showed great tolerance and exercised much restraint towards such acts, but 
also put forward the initiative to “shelve dispute and seek joint development”. Apart 
from concluding bilateral agreements with each administration of the Philippines to 
Standards to Identify and Decide the Legality of State Aviation Behaviors 
Performed in the South China Sea Region 189
settle their disputes over the SCS through negotiations, China also issued, together 
with the ASEAN countries, the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South 
China Sea, and actively negotiate with the States concerned to formulate the Code 
of Conduct in the South China Sea, with an aim to maintain the peace and stability 
of the SCS region by taking practical actions. 
B. The Legal Status of the Airspace over the SCS
As stated above, the rights China enjoys over the area enclosed by the 
U-shaped line in the SCS should include, all the existing and future rights 
necessary for the development of the SCS islands, and for the maintenance of 
the sovereign relations between China’s mainland territory and its indispensable 
archipelagic waters. “All future rights” is used here because China’s rights over 
the area enclosed by the U-shaped line would not remain unchanged, and we 
should see these rights with foresight. Previously, the administration and economic 
development of islands were chiefly carried out through ships, but with the 
development of new technology, such jobs can also be performed through aircraft, 
network and communication equipment, and etc. 
On 6 January 2016, two civilian airplanes requisitioned by Chinese govern-
ment took off from Haikou Meilan International Airport, and successfully landed 
at 10:21 a.m. and 10:46 a.m., respectively, on the airfield newly built on the Fiery 
Cross Reef after nearly 2 hours’ flight. These two planes returned to Haikou, 
China, in the afternoon of the same day, signifying that the test flight is successful. 
In addition, on 13 July of the same year, a flight took off from Haikou Meilan 
International Airport at 8:30 a.m. and landed on the newly built airfield on the Meiji 
Reef two hours later, while another took off from Haikou at 8:40 a.m. and landed on 
the airfield on the Zhubi Reef at 10:28 a.m.. The two civilian planes, one chartered 
by China Southern Airlines and the other by Hainan Airlines, both returned to 
Haikou after a short stay on the reefs. This successful test flight demonstrates 
that both airfields have the capability to ensure the safe operation of large civilian 
aircraft, which, in turn, would provide a convenient means of transportation for the 
provision of daily supplies to the SCS islands, as well as the relevant passenger 
traffic and medical aid. Furthermore, these airfields may serve as alternate airports 
in the SCS for cross-ocean flights, and are also in the position to offer cheaper and 
more flexible air routes options. Such flights fully reflect that China has employed a 
new vehicle to manage and develop the SCS islands. 
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Similar to China’s rights over the relevant sea areas of SCS, its rights to 
the SCS airspace should include all the existing and future rights necessary for 
the development of the SCS islands, and for the maintenance of the sovereign 
relations between China’s mainland territory and its indispensable archipelagic 
waters. According to Article 3 of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the 
South China Sea, “[t]he Parties reaffirm their respect for and commitment to the 
freedom of navigation in and overflight above the South China Sea as provided for 
by the universally recognized principles of international law, including the 1982 
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.” Notably, such freedom of navigation and 
overflight should not be with prejudice to all the existing and future rights of China 
as described above.
Therefore, the rights China enjoys over the SCS airspace have the priority over 
the freedom of navigation or overflight, which is closely related to the principle of 
state sovereignty. The Charter of the United Nations (hereinafter “UN Charter”) 
laid particular stress on state sovereignty. The SCS region, which serves as the 
important base supporting China’s management and development of the Dongsha, 
Zhongsha, Xisha and Nansha Islands as well as their adjacent waters, has sovereign 
relations with China’s mainland. Moreover, such sovereign relations have been 
exhibited in a continuous and consistent way. That is to say, the method that China 
adopted to manage and develop these SCS islands is a customary way recognized 
by the modern international law. Consequently, “the freedom of navigation in and 
overflight above the South China Sea” should not affect the exercise of China’s 
rights abovementioned.
III. The Differences between State and 
       Civil Aviation Behaviors
A. The Features of State Aviation Behavior
In accordance with UNCLOS Articles 38, 53, 58 and 87, ships have, to varying 
extent, freedom of navigation in the straits used for international navigation, 
archipelagic waters of archipelagic States, EEZs and the high seas, while aircraft 
have varying degree of freedom of overflight over such sea areas. Coastal States 
generally adopt the transit passage regime for vessels going through the straits used 
for international navigation, but also the innocent passage regime in exceptional 
cases. Article 4 of the 1963 Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts 
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Committed on Board Aircraft stipulates that a coastal State could interfere with an 
aircraft in flight over the high seas in order to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over 
an offence committed on board in exceptional cases. According to international 
customs and usage, coastal States have universal jurisdiction over international 
crimes committed on the high seas, such as piracy, slave trafficking and hijack. 
However, the author contends, the operation of aircraft in the SCS airspace, 
should be subject to all the existing and future rights enjoyable by China, as 
necessary for the maintenance of the sovereign relations between China’s mainland 
territory and its indispensable archipelagic waters, and for the development of its 
SCS islands. Therefore, the existing regimes cannot apply to the SCS airspace. That 
is to say, a regime should be specially designed for the SCS airspace, by utilizing 
and developing international law. 
The creation of such a regime requires us to classify and identify the aircraft 
over the SCS. Both the Chicago Convention and the Civil Aviation Law of the 
People’s Republic of China have differentiated state aircraft from civil aircraft, but 
failed to distinguish state from civil aviation behaviors.  
Having the feature of quick movement and covering extensive areas, aviation 
behaviors are quite likely to get involved in sovereignty disputes. In that case, 
aviation behaviors, civil or state, should show enough concerns over any act that 
may be mistaken as any act of aggression, in order to avoid aircraft being shot 
down by mistake.
1. The Debate over the Status of Airspace
The debate over the status of airspace started from the 1912 Annual Confe-
rence of the International Law Association held in Brussels. Two opposing opinions 
appeared in this conference: one holds that every State enjoys the freedom to fly in 
the airspace of other States, and the other asserts that every State has sovereignty 
over the airspace above its territory. 
The first assertion that every State enjoys the freedom to fly in the airspace of 
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other States,9 is represented by the International Air Services Transit Agreement and 
the International Air Transport Agreement. In practice, such freedom of overflight 
contradicts with the principle of state territorial sovereignty, since state sovereignty 
also extends to the territorial airspace. In particular, in terms of its natural attribute, 
territorial airspace covers territory and territorial sea; therefore, if foreign aircraft 
are allowed to fly freely in the airspace of a State, that State would be exposed to 
risks beyond calculation. 
The Chicago Convention, a representative international treaty holding every 
State has sovereignty over the airspace above its territory, provides explicitly in its 
Article 1 that “[t]he contracting States recognize that every State has complete and 
exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory.”
2. The Particularity of State Aviation Behavior
Considering the attributes of civil aviation, and the illegal downing of civil 
aircraft appeared in history, to avoid using force against civil aviation behaviors 
has gradually become a global concern. However, such incidents had not been 
anticipated at the time when the Chicago Convention was prepared. Therefore, 
people often quoted Article 2(4) of UN Charter, “All Members shall refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity 
9 　 Article 1(1) of the International Air Services Transit Agreement provides that: “Each 
contracting State grants to the other contracting States the following freedoms of the air 
in respect of scheduled international air services: 1. The privilege to fly across its territory 
without landing; 2. The privilege to land for non-traffic purposes. The privileges of this 
section shall not be applicable with respect to airports utilized for military purposes to 
the exclusion of any scheduled international air services. In areas of active hostilities or 
of military occupation, and in time of war along the supply routes leading to such areas, 
the exercise of such privileges shall be subject to the approval of the competent military 
authorities.” Additionally, Article 1(1) of the International Air Transport Agreement 
stipulates that: “Each contracting State grants to the other contracting States the following 
freedoms of the air in respect of scheduled international air services: 1. The privilege to 
fly across its territory without landing; 2. The privilege to land for non-traffic purposes; 
3. The privilege to put down passengers, mail and cargo taken on in the territory of the 
State whose nationality the aircraft possesses; 4. The privilege to take on passengers, mail 
and cargo destined for the territory of the State whose nationality the aircraft possesses; 5. 
The privilege to take on passengers, mail and cargo destined for the territory of any other 
contracting State and the privilege to put down passengers, mail and cargo coming from any 
such territory. With respect to the privileges specified under paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of this 
section, the undertaking of each contracting State relates only to through services on a route 
constituting a reasonably direct line out from and back to the homeland of the State whose 
nationality the aircraft possesses. The privileges of this section shall not be applicable 
with respect to airports utilized for military purposes to the exclusion of any scheduled 
international air services. In areas of active hostilities or of military occupation, and in time 
of war along the supply routes leading to such areas, the exercise of such privileges shall be 
subject to the approval of the competent military authorities.”
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or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
Purposes of the United Nations.” After the crash of Korean Air Lines Flight 007 in 
1983, the ICAO adopted a resolution on 6 March, 1984, based on its investigation, 
saying that any use of weapon against civil aircraft was incompatible with the 
rules of international law, no matter what reasons caused the airplane to deviate 
from its scheduled route. However, the resolution failed to specify which rule of 
international law was violated. In May of the same year, Article 3 bis was added to 
the Chicago Convention, which provided that every State must refrain from the use 
of weapons against civil aircraft in flight.
However, State aviation behavior is different from civil one in the following 
aspects: 
First, the subject of state aviation behavior is State, while the subject of civil 
aviation behavior is individuals or any other entities. Notably, the concept of 
“State” here mainly refers to state power, which is not a civil subject. In that case, 
the operation of state-owned airlines should be differentiated from state operation. 
The “state” in the expression of “state-owned airlines” is used in the sense of civil 
subject. That is to say, state, as a civil subject, conducts civil act. It follows that the 
operation of state-owned airlines is civil aviation behavior. 
Second, state aviation behavior is of the nature of state mission, which reflects 
the administrative power of a State. Hence, in case of conflicts with the sovereignty 
of other States, state aviation behavior is much more complex than civil avia-
tion activities. Sovereignty means the supreme power internally, the right to inde-
pendence externally, and the right of self-defence to prevent foreign invasion. 
Therefore, state aviation behavior reflects sovereignty in whole or in part, which 
shows a kind of power. It should refrain from jeopardizing the sovereignty of other 
sovereign States. In contrast, civil aviation behavior is a kind of civil acts by civil 
subjects with equal status, which manifests the “rights” of such subjects.
Third, all the principal international aviation conventions contain provisions 
defining whether they are applicable to state aviation behaviors, and also roughly 
distinguish their application in different areas. Comparatively, international 
regulations contain detailed provisions on civil aviation behaviors, but almost 
without any provisions on state aviation behaviors. 
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re
se
rv
e 
to
 th
em
se
lv
es
 th
e 
ri
gh
t t
o 
de
cl
ar
e 
at
 th
e 
ti
m
e 
of
 r
at
ifi
ca
ti
on
 o
r 
of
 a
cc
es
si
on
 t
ha
t 
th
e 
fi
rs
t 
pa
ra
gr
ap
h 
of
 A
rt
ic
le
 2
 o
f 
th
is
 C
on
ve
nt
io
n 
sh
al
l n
ot
 a
pp
ly
 to
 in
te
rn
at
io
na
l c
ar
ria
ge
 b
y 
ai
r 
pe
rf
or
m
ed
 d
ire
ct
ly
 
by
 th
e 
St
at
e,
 it
s 
co
lo
ni
es
, p
ro
te
ct
or
at
es
 o
r m
an
da
te
d 
te
rri
to
rie
s 
or
 b
y 
an
y 
ot
he
r 
te
rr
ito
ry
 u
nd
er
 it
s 
so
ve
re
ig
nt
y,
 s
uz
er
ai
nt
y 
or
 a
ut
ho
rit
y”
. 
Th
er
ef
or
e,
 w
he
th
er
 th
e 
W
ar
sa
w
 C
on
ve
nt
io
n 
ap
pl
ie
s 
to
 s
ta
te
 a
vi
at
io
n 
be
ha
vi
or
 i
s 
st
ill
 d
ep
en
de
nt
 u
po
n 
th
e 
re
se
rv
at
io
n 
m
ad
e 
by
 t
he
 
co
nt
ra
ct
in
g 
St
at
es
.
Standards to Identify and Decide the Legality of State Aviation Behaviors 
Performed in the South China Sea Region 195
Pr
ot
oc
ol
 to
 A
m
en
d 
th
e 
Co
nv
en
tio
n 
fo
r t
he
 
U
ni
fi
ca
ti
on
 o
f 
C
er
ta
in
 
Ru
le
s R
el
at
in
g 
to
 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l C
ar
ria
ge
 b
y 
A
ir 
(h
er
ei
na
fte
r “
H
ag
ue
 
Pr
ot
oc
ol
”)
A
pp
lic
ab
le
A
pp
lic
ab
le
 to
 st
at
e 
av
ia
tio
n 
be
ha
vi
or
, 
de
pe
nd
in
g 
on
 th
e 
no
ti
fi
ca
ti
on
 m
ad
e 
by
 a
 c
on
tra
ct
in
g 
St
at
e
A
rti
cl
e 
26
 o
f 
H
ag
ue
 P
ro
to
co
l p
ro
vi
de
s,
 “
N
o 
re
se
rv
at
io
n 
m
ay
 b
e 
m
ad
e 
to
 th
is 
Pr
ot
oc
ol
 e
xc
ep
t t
ha
t a
 S
ta
te
 m
ay
 a
t a
ny
 ti
m
e 
de
cl
ar
e 
by
 
a 
no
ti
fi
ca
ti
on
 a
dd
re
ss
ed
 t
o 
th
e 
G
ov
er
nm
en
t 
of
 t
he
 P
eo
pl
e’
s 
R
ep
ub
li
c 
of
 P
ol
an
d 
th
at
 th
e 
Co
nv
en
tio
n 
as
 a
m
en
de
d 
by
 th
is 
Pr
ot
oc
ol
 s
ha
ll 
no
t 
ap
pl
y 
to
 th
e 
ca
rri
ag
e 
of
 p
er
so
ns
, c
ar
go
 a
nd
 b
ag
ga
ge
 fo
r i
ts 
m
ili
ta
ry
 
au
th
or
iti
es
 o
n 
ai
rc
ra
ft,
 re
gi
ste
re
d 
in
 th
at
 S
ta
te
, t
he
 w
ho
le
 c
ap
ac
ity
 o
f 
w
hi
ch
 h
as
 b
ee
n 
re
se
rv
ed
 b
y 
or
 o
n 
be
ha
lf 
of
 s
uc
h 
au
th
or
iti
es
.”
 T
ha
t 
is 
to
 s
ay
, H
ag
ue
 P
ro
to
co
l a
pp
lie
s 
to
 c
iv
il 
av
ia
tio
n 
be
ha
vi
or
s, 
an
d 
to
 
st
at
e 
av
ia
tio
n 
be
ha
vi
or
s 
de
pe
nd
in
g 
on
 th
e 
no
tif
ic
at
io
n 
m
ad
e 
by
 a
 
co
nt
ra
ct
in
g 
St
at
e.
 
Co
nv
en
tio
n 
Su
pp
le
m
en
ta
ry
 to
 th
e 
W
ar
sa
w
 C
on
ve
nt
io
n 
fo
r 
th
e 
U
ni
fi
ca
ti
on
 o
f 
Ce
rta
in
 R
ul
es
 R
el
at
in
g 
to
 In
te
rn
at
io
na
l C
ar
ria
ge
 
by
 A
ir 
Pe
rfo
rm
ed
 b
y 
a 
Pe
rs
on
 O
th
er
 th
an
 th
e 
Co
nt
ra
ct
in
g 
Ca
rri
er
 
(h
er
ei
na
fte
r “
G
ua
da
la
ja
ra
 
Co
nv
en
tio
n”
)
A
pp
lic
ab
le
A
pp
lic
ab
le
 to
 st
at
e 
av
ia
tio
n 
be
ha
vi
or
, 
de
pe
nd
in
g 
on
 th
e 
re
se
rv
at
io
n 
an
d 
no
ti
fi
ca
ti
on
 m
ad
e 
by
 a
 c
on
tra
ct
in
g 
St
at
e
T
he
 G
ua
da
la
ja
ra
 C
on
ve
nt
io
n,
 w
hi
ch
 s
et
s 
ou
t 
ru
le
s 
fo
r 
so
m
e 
sp
ec
ifi
c 
is
su
es
, b
as
ic
al
ly
 f
ol
lo
w
s 
th
e 
ru
le
s 
un
de
r 
th
e 
W
ar
sa
w
 C
on
ve
nt
io
n 
co
nc
er
ni
ng
 it
s a
pp
lic
ab
ili
ty
 to
 st
at
e 
an
d 
ci
vi
l a
vi
at
io
n 
be
ha
vi
or
s. 
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Pr
ot
oc
ol
 to
 A
m
en
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th
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Co
nv
en
tio
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fo
r t
he
 
U
ni
fi
ca
ti
on
 o
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C
er
ta
in
 
Ru
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el
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to
 
In
te
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na
l C
ar
ria
ge
 
by
 A
ir,
 a
s A
m
en
de
d 
by
 
th
e 
Pr
ot
oc
ol
 D
on
e 
at
 th
e 
H
ag
ue
 o
n 
28
 S
ep
te
m
be
r 
19
55
 (h
er
ei
na
fte
r 
“G
ua
te
m
al
a 
Ci
ty
 
Pr
ot
oc
ol
”)
A
pp
lic
ab
le
A
pp
lic
ab
le
 to
 st
at
e 
av
ia
tio
n 
be
ha
vi
or
, 
de
pe
nd
in
g 
on
 th
e 
re
se
rv
at
io
n 
an
d 
no
ti
fi
ca
ti
on
 m
ad
e 
by
 a
 c
on
tra
ct
in
g 
St
at
e
A
rti
cl
e 
23
 o
f t
he
 G
ua
te
m
al
a 
Ci
ty
 P
ro
to
co
l p
re
sc
rib
es
, “
a 
St
at
e 
m
ay
 
at
 a
ny
 t
im
e 
de
cl
ar
e 
by
 a
 n
ot
ifi
ca
ti
on
 a
dd
re
ss
ed
 t
o 
th
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
Ci
vi
l A
vi
at
io
n 
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
n 
th
at
 th
e 
W
ar
sa
w
 C
on
ve
nt
io
n 
as
 a
m
en
de
d 
at
 T
he
 H
ag
ue
 1
95
5,
 a
nd
 a
t G
ua
te
m
al
a 
Ci
ty
, 1
97
1 
sh
al
l n
ot
 a
pp
ly
 to
 
th
e 
ca
rri
ag
e 
of
 p
er
so
ns
, b
ag
ga
ge
 a
nd
 c
ar
go
 fo
r i
ts 
m
ili
ta
ry
 a
ut
ho
rit
ie
s 
on
 a
irc
ra
ft,
 re
gi
ste
re
d 
in
 th
at
 S
ta
te
, t
he
 w
ho
le
 c
ap
ac
ity
 o
f w
hi
ch
 h
as
 
be
en
 r
es
er
ve
d 
by
 o
r 
on
 b
eh
al
f 
of
 s
uc
h 
au
th
or
iti
es
.”
 I
t m
ea
ns
 th
at
 
G
ua
te
m
al
a 
Ci
ty
 P
ro
to
co
l a
pp
lie
s 
to
 c
iv
il 
av
ia
tio
n 
be
ha
vi
or
s, 
an
d 
to
 
st
at
e 
av
ia
tio
n 
be
ha
vi
or
s 
de
pe
nd
in
g 
on
 th
e 
re
se
rv
at
io
n 
an
d 
no
tifi
ca
tio
n 
m
ad
e 
by
 a
 c
on
tra
ct
in
g 
St
at
e.
 
Co
nv
en
tio
n 
fo
r t
he
 
U
ni
fi
ca
ti
on
 o
f 
C
er
ta
in
 
Ru
le
s f
or
 In
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
Ca
rri
ag
e 
by
 A
ir 
(h
er
ei
na
fte
r “
M
on
tre
al
 
Co
nv
en
tio
n”
)
A
pp
lic
ab
le
In
ap
pl
ic
ab
le
 to
 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
av
ia
tio
n 
ac
tiv
iti
es
 
ca
rri
ed
 o
ut
 fo
r 
m
ili
ta
ry
, c
us
to
m
s 
or
 p
ol
ic
e 
pu
rp
os
es
Th
e 
M
on
tr
ea
l 
C
on
ve
nt
io
n 
ai
m
s 
to
 e
ns
ur
e 
th
e 
pr
ot
ec
tio
n 
of
 t
he
 
in
te
re
sts
 o
f c
on
su
m
er
s i
n 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l c
ar
ria
ge
 b
y 
ai
r, 
an
d 
es
ta
bl
ish
 a
 
eq
ui
ta
bl
e 
co
m
pe
ns
at
io
n 
sy
ste
m
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
th
e 
pr
in
ci
pl
e 
of
 re
sti
tu
tio
n,
 
in
 c
as
e 
of
 d
ea
th
 o
r 
in
ju
ry
 o
f 
pa
ss
en
ge
rs
, d
am
ag
e 
to
 b
ag
ga
ge
, o
r 
da
m
ag
e 
to
 c
ar
go
 d
ur
in
g 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l c
ar
ria
ge
 b
y 
ai
r. 
A
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 
th
e 
ai
m
 o
f 
th
e 
co
nv
en
tio
n,
 th
is
 c
on
ve
nt
io
n 
so
le
ly
 a
pp
lie
s 
to
 c
iv
il 
av
ia
tio
n 
be
ha
vi
or
s. 
Co
nv
en
tio
n 
fo
r t
he
 
U
ni
fi
ca
ti
on
 o
f 
C
er
ta
in
 
Ru
le
s R
el
at
in
g 
to
 th
e 
Pr
ec
au
tio
na
ry
 A
tta
ch
m
en
t 
of
 A
irc
ra
ft
Pa
rtl
y 
A
pp
lic
ab
le
Pa
rtl
y 
A
pp
lic
ab
le
A
rti
cl
e 
3 
of
 th
e 
C
on
ve
nt
io
n 
fo
r 
th
e 
U
ni
fic
at
io
n 
of
 C
er
ta
in
 R
ul
es
 
R
el
at
in
g 
to
 t
he
 P
re
ca
ut
io
na
ry
 A
tta
ch
m
en
t 
of
 A
ir
cr
af
t 
pr
ov
id
es
, 
“(
1)
 T
he
 f
ol
lo
w
in
g 
ai
rc
ra
ft 
sh
al
l b
e 
ex
em
pt
 f
ro
m
 p
re
ca
ut
io
na
ry
 
at
ta
ch
m
en
t: 
(a
) 
A
ir
cr
af
t 
as
si
gn
ed
 e
xc
lu
si
ve
ly
 t
o 
a 
G
ov
er
nm
en
t 
se
rv
ic
e,
 th
e 
po
sta
l s
er
vi
ce
 in
cl
ud
ed
, c
om
m
er
ce
 e
xc
ep
te
d;
 (b
) A
irc
ra
ft 
ac
tu
al
ly
 p
ut
 in
 s
er
vi
ce
 o
n 
a 
re
gu
la
r 
lin
e 
of
 p
ub
lic
 tr
an
sp
or
ta
tio
n 
an
d 
in
di
sp
en
sa
bl
e 
re
se
rv
e 
ai
rc
ra
ft;
 (
c)
 A
ny
 o
th
er
 a
irc
ra
ft 
as
si
gn
ed
 
to
 tr
an
sp
or
ta
tio
n 
of
 p
er
so
ns
 o
r 
pr
op
er
ty
 f
or
 h
ire
, w
he
n 
it 
is
 r
ea
dy
 
to
 d
ep
ar
t f
or
 s
uc
h 
tra
ns
po
rta
tio
n,
 e
xc
ep
t i
n 
a 
ca
se
 in
vo
lv
in
g 
a 
de
bt
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co
nt
ra
ct
ed
 fo
r t
he
 tr
ip
 w
hi
ch
 it
 is
 a
bo
ut
 to
 m
ak
e 
or
 a
 c
la
im
 a
ris
in
g 
in
 
th
e 
co
ur
se
 o
f t
he
 tr
ip
. (
2)
 T
he
 p
ro
vi
sio
ns
 o
f t
he
 p
re
se
nt
 A
rti
cl
e 
sh
al
l 
no
t a
pp
ly
 to
 a
 p
re
ca
ut
io
na
ry
 a
tta
ch
m
en
t m
ad
e 
by
 th
e 
ow
ne
r 
of
 a
n 
ai
rc
ra
ft 
w
ho
 h
as
 b
ee
n 
di
sp
os
se
ss
ed
 o
f t
he
 s
am
e 
by
 a
n 
un
la
w
fu
l a
ct
.”
 
Th
er
ef
or
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pl
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 c
iv
il 
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ia
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ha
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or
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 p
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at
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ra
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at
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ve
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te
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at
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ec
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ig
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 C
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ve
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ft 
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ili
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, c
us
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m
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 p
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e 
se
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 T
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ap
pl
ie
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 c
iv
il 
av
ia
tio
n 
be
ha
vi
or
s, 
bu
t n
ot
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te
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na
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tio
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tiv
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 c
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ol
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pu
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hi
rd
 P
ar
tie
s 
on
 th
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C
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H
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 C
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ve
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 D
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ir
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ar
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Su
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 c
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O
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m
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ly
 c
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d 
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e 
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m
e 
C
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ve
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n 
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ai
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d 
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 c
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 d
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e 
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e 
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th
er
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Co
m
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A
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ve
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ap
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 to
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at
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m
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, c
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to
m
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e 
pu
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A
rti
cl
e 
1(
4)
 o
f t
he
 T
ok
yo
 C
on
ve
nt
io
n 
sta
te
s, 
“T
hi
s 
Co
nv
en
tio
n 
sh
al
l 
no
t a
pp
ly
 to
 a
irc
ra
ft 
us
ed
 in
 m
ili
ta
ry
, c
us
to
m
s 
or
 p
ol
ic
e 
se
rv
ic
es
.”
 
Th
at
 is
 to
 sa
y,
 th
is 
co
nv
en
tio
n 
ap
pl
ie
s t
o 
ci
vi
l a
vi
at
io
n 
be
ha
vi
or
s, 
bu
t 
no
t i
nt
er
na
tio
na
l a
vi
at
io
n 
ac
tiv
iti
es
 c
ar
rie
d 
ou
t f
or
 m
ili
ta
ry
, c
us
to
m
s 
or
 p
ol
ic
e 
pu
rp
os
es
.
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Co
nv
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tio
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Sa
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 o
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at
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, c
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ua
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 A
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4(
1)
 o
f 
th
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co
nv
en
tio
n,
 th
is
 C
on
ve
nt
io
n 
ap
pl
ie
s 
to
 c
iv
il 
ai
rc
ra
ft,
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 to
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irc
ra
ft 
us
ed
 in
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, c
us
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m
s o
r p
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e 
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Co
nv
en
tio
n 
on
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e 
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pp
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n 
of
 
U
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l A
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s R
el
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rn
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na
l C
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ia
tio
n 
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“B
ei
jin
g 
Co
nv
en
tio
n”
) a
nd
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ot
oc
ol
 S
up
pl
em
en
ta
ry
 to
 
th
e 
Co
nv
en
tio
n 
fo
r t
he
 S
up
pr
es
sio
n 
of
 
U
nl
aw
fu
l S
ei
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 o
f 
A
irc
ra
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(h
er
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fte
r 
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g 
Pr
ot
oc
ol
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A
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le
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 to
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at
io
na
l 
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ed
 o
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r 
m
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ry
, c
us
to
m
s 
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ol
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e 
pu
rp
os
es
A
rti
cl
e 
5 
of
 B
ei
jin
g 
C
on
ve
nt
io
n 
pr
ov
id
es
 th
at
 it
 a
pp
lie
s 
to
 c
iv
il 
av
ia
tio
n 
be
ha
vi
or
s, 
bu
t n
ot
 in
te
rn
at
io
na
l a
vi
at
io
n 
ac
tiv
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es
 c
ar
rie
d 
ou
t f
or
 m
ili
ta
ry
, c
us
to
m
s o
r p
ol
ic
e 
pu
rp
os
es
.
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The differences listed above show that state aircraft behaviors performed in 
foreign and international airspace need to be carefully studied. In practice, such 
behaviors have led to conflicts of powers, or sovereignty conflicts, which give rise 
to the question on how to determine an act of aggression. Given that the global anti-
terrorism situation is still severe at present, the study on aggression should not only 
made from a conventional angle, but also take anti-terrorism factors into account. 
B. The Source of the Definition for Act of Aggression
1. Article 51 of the UN Charter
Article 51 of the UN Charter provides, 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual 
or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the 
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary 
to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members 
in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported 
to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and 
responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at 
any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore 
international peace and security.
A State’s right to self-defence when suffering an armed attack, which is 
granted to the State by this Article 51, originates from the principle of state 
sovereignty. The sovereignty of a State means that a State can independently deal 
with its domestic and foreign affairs, and has the supreme authority to administrate 
itself. 
“Armed attack”, the core concept in this article, is a factor that triggers the 
exercise of the right to self-defence.10 However, the opinions of different States 
vary with respect to the requirements of “armed attack”. 
2. The Caroline Rule
In 1837, the United Kingdom was facing a rebellion in Canada, which at 
that time was still under British control. A number of the rebel forces acting in 
10    Tarcisio Gazzimi, The Changing Rules on the Use of Force in International Law, Man-
chester: Manchester University Press, 2005, p. 132.
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support of the Canadian rebellion (the majority of which being U.S. nationals) 
were stationed on Navy Island on the Canadian side of the Niagara River. They 
were supplied in munitions and personnel by the Caroline, which was an American 
steamer hired for that purpose. On December 29, while the Caroline was docked 
at Schlosser, in U.S. territory, it was attacked by British forces that set fire to the 
steamer and towed it over Niagara Falls. In the process, a U.S. citizen was killed. 
The U.S. protested against the British act. However, the U.K. alleged that its act 
was necessary for self-defense and self-preservation.11 And the Caroline Rule was 
established in this case, which says that self-defence may be justified only in cases 
where the “necessity of that self-defense is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no 
choice of means, and no moment for deliberation”.12
However, due to the traditions of case law, the facts of the Caroline case had 
overwhelming influence on the interpretation of conclusions, which highlighted the 
element of “preemptive self-defense” in the case. 
3. Article 9 of Chicago Convention and the “No-Fly Zones” 
Imposed by the UN Security Council
Article 9 of Chicago Convention states, 
Prohibited areas 
a) Each contracting State may, for reasons of military necessity or 
public safety, restrict or prohibit uniformly the aircraft of other States from 
flying over certain areas of its territory, provided that no distinction in this 
respect is made between the aircraft of the State whose territory is involved, 
engaged in international scheduled airline services, and the aircraft of the 
other contracting States likewise engaged. Such prohibited areas shall be 
of reasonable extent and location so as not to interfere unnecessarily with 
air navigation. Descriptions of such prohibited areas in the territory of a 
contracting State, as well as any subsequent alterations therein, shall be 
communicated as soon as possible to the other contracting States and to the 
International Civil Aviation Organization. 
b) Each contracting State reserves also the right, in exceptional circums-
11     James A. Green, Docking the Caroline: Understanding the Relevance of the Formula in 
Temporary Customary International Law Concerning Self-Defense, Cardozo Journal of 
International and Comparative Law, Vol. 14, Issue 2, 2006, pp. 433~435.
12　  R. Y. Jennings, The Caroline and Mcleod Cases, American Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 32, Issue 1, 1938, pp. 91~92.
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tances or during a period of emergency, or in the interest of public safety, and 
with immediate effect, temporarily to restrict or prohibit flying over the whole 
or any part of its territory, on condition that such restriction or prohibition 
shall be applicable without distinction of nationality to aircraft of all other 
States. 
c) Each contracting State, under such regulations as it may prescribe, 
may require any aircraft entering the areas contemplated in subparagraphs 
a) or b) above to effect a landing as soon as practicable thereafter at some 
designated airport within its territory.
In conformity with Article 9 of the Chicago Convention, the Spanish 
Government, in 1967, declared the Spanish airspace surrounding Algeciras Bay a 
zone prohibited to aerial navigation. The U.K. protested against this declaration and 
forwarded its concerns over the issue to the ICAO Council. Nevertheless, since this 
issue was politicized, the deliberation of this issue was postponed indefinitely. 
It should be noted, since the Chicago Convention does not apply to state 
aviation behaviors, it has little effect on state aviation behaviors if its Article 9 is 
invoked.
UN Security Council, by invoking the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, 
imposes limits on the airspace over the territory of a State. For example, UN 
Security Council imposed a “No-Fly Zone” over Libya in 2011, which has effect on 
state aviation behaviors. 
C. The Requirements of an Armed Attack
Both the Caroline Rule and Article 51 of the UN Charter consider “armed 
attack” as a condition that triggers the exercise of right to self-defence. However, 
neither of them articulate what types of actions constitute an “armed attack”. 
1. Restrictive Interpretation
According to restrictive interpretation in the conventional sense, “if an 
armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations” under UN Charter 
Article 51 should be strictly, narrowly and precisely construed. Such an restrictive 
interpretation greatly limits a sovereign State’s right to defend itself, since a State 
can defend itself only when it suffers an armed attack. And this time frame does not 
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include the preparatory phase prior to an armed attack.13 Moreover, some scholars 
even hold that an armed attack should actually take place and continue for a period 
of time.14
In addition, the restrictive interpretation of armed attack was also modified to 
some extent. It is asserted that if one of two neighboring States launches a rocket 
threatening the safety of its neighbor, then the right to self-defence can be invoked 
under Article 51 of the UN Charter.15 It is also proposed that, apart from the 
conditions above, such an attack should also be “irreversible”.16
2. Extensive Interpretation
Restrictive interpretation is closely associated with the time dominated by land 
battles. However, with the development of military technology, warcraft, cruise 
missiles and other weapons of mass destruction become the main weapons used 
in wars, which poses challenges to the conventional way to determine an “armed 
attack”. For example, when a State has deployed its precision guided missiles, 
its neighboring States, if within the attack range of the missiles, would suffer 
devastating blows at any time.  
In this new context, the extensive interpretation of an “armed attack” was 
formed. When attacked by high-tech weapons, the State attacked may not be able 
to effectively react to the attack, which would actually put the State in a passive 
position. Therefore, as one scholar proposed, if a State may only exercise the right 
to self-defence when a missile crosses its border, then the concept of effective self-
defence would be meaningless.17
3. The Anti-Terrorism Factors in an Act of Aggression 
During the 9/11 attacks, an American fighter attempted to intercept the 
fourth airplane seized by the terrorists. Unfortunately, this fighter crashed in the 
air over Pennsylvania before the interception. Immediately after the 9/11 attacks, 
U.S. President George W. Bush, Secretary of Defense Donald Henry Rumsfeld 
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff formulated a new code of conduct in case of similar 
13　 Zhou Gengsheng, International Law, Beijing: The Commercial Press, p. 199. (in Chinese)
14    Xu Guangjian ed., Commentary on the Charter of United Nations, Taiyuan: Shanxi Educa-
tion Press, 1999, pp. 353~360. (in Chinese)
15　 Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1963, p. 367.
16　 Singh M. Narendra, The Right of Self-Defence in Relation to the Use of Nuclear Weapons, 
Indian Yearbook of International Affairs, 1956, Vol. 5, pp. 25~26.
17　 Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1963, pp. 366~369.
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emergencies. Before the new code, the U.S. Department of Defense had not been 
officially approved to use force against any hijacked airplane.18
Article 7 (Suppressing Terrorist Acts in the Air) of the Russian Federal Law 
No. 35-FZ on Counteraction of Terrorism (2006) specifies, 
1. The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation shall use their weapons and 
military equipment in the procedure established by normative legal acts of 
the Russian Federation for the purpose of removing the threat of a terrorist 
act in the air or for the purpose of suppressing such terrorist act. 2. If an 
aircraft does not react to radio commands of ground control centers to stop 
violating the rules of using the airspace of the Russian Federation and (or) to 
radio commands and visual signals of the aircrafts of the Armed Forces of the 
Russian Federation sent to intercept it, or refuses to follow radio commands 
or visual signals not explaining the reasons for it, the Armed Forces of the 
Russian Federation shall use their weapons and military equipment for 
preventing the flight of the said aircraft by way of forcing it to land. If the 
aircraft does not obey the demand to land and there is a real danger of the 
loss of life or the onset of an ecological catastrophe, the weapons and military 
equipment shall be used for preventing the flight of the said aircraft by way 
of destroying it. 3. Where there is reliable information about the probable 
use of an aircraft for committing an act of terrorism or about the occupation 
of an aircraft and, with that, all measures required under the circumstances 
for its landing have been taken and there is a real danger of the loss of life 
or the onset of an ecological catastrophe, the Armed Forces of the Russian 
Federation shall use their weapons and military equipment for preventing the 
flight of the said aircraft by way of destroying it.19
The government of Slovakia adopted a decree on 16 February 2005, 
authorizing its Defence Minister to order the downing of any aircraft violating 
its airspace, if necessary. In accordance with this decree, Slovakian air force is 
empowered to intercept any aircraft entering its airspace. In exceptional cases, 
where there are clear evidences indicating that the aircraft entering its airspace is 
18    U.S. Air Force Conducted Live-Fire Drills with Respect to Hijacked Airliners, at http://mil.
news.sina.com.cn/2003-10-05/153963.html, 24 November 2016. (in Chinese)
19     Xu Guimin, A Review on the Features of Russian Legislation against Terrorism, Global
Law Review, Vol. 35, No. 1, 2013, p. 57. (in Chinese)
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employed by terrorists to launch attacks, which may cause severe damages to life 
or property, the Slovakian Defence Minister has the right to order the downing of 
such aircraft, be it civil or military.20
In the current situation of global anti-terrorism, prior assertions that terrorist 
acts constituted an “armed attack” have met great challenges.21 Such assertions 
are regarded as a strange formalism in modern day,22 which therefore need to be 
evolved. Particularly, the UN Security Council, in its Resolution 1368, did not 
connect the exercise of the right to self-defence with armed attacks launched by 
States, but expressly pointed out the notion of “terrorist attacks”. Additionally, 
neither UN Security Council in its Resolution 1373, nor the International Court 
of Justice in Oil Platforms (Iran v. USA), correlated armed attacks with state 
behaviors. 
Due to the increasing of global anti-terrorist actions and regional conflicts 
and confrontations, the security of civil aircraft, when flying over the conflict 
areas, became a global concern. In 2014, ICAO set up the Task Force on Risks 
to Civil Aviation Arising from Conflict Zones, which convened four meetings 
consecutively. The meetings studied the safety and security crises facing civil 
aviation arising from conflict zones.23
Against the backdrop of international anti-terrorism, States are inclined 
to, when assessing whether a particular action can constitute an act of aviation 
aggression, focus on the aviation behavior per se, instead of judging whether it is 
performed by a State or not. That is to say, the corresponding rules of international 
law have been less invoked against the background of anti-terrorism.
20   European States Pass Laws Authorizing Shooting Down of Hijacked Aircraft in Order 
to Avoid the Replaying of  9/11 Tragedy, at http://news.tom.com/1003/3295/2005114-
1761852.html, 24 November 2016. (in Chinese)
21    Sean D. Murphy, Terrorism and the Concept of Armed Attack in Article 51 of the UN 
Charter, Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 43, No. 1, 2002, pp. 45~46.
22　 Christopher Greenwood, International Law and the Pre-emptive Use of Force: Afghanistan, 
Al-Qaida, and Iraq, San Diego International Law Journal, Vol. 4, 2003, pp. 16~17.
23      The author attended the fourth meeting of the special group held by the ICAO from 13 to 15 
July 2015, in Montreal, Canada. The meeting reviewed the application of the Convention 
on International Civil Aviation and other civil aviation treaties relating to conflict zones. 
Delegates from 15 States, including China, the United States, Russia and Ukraine, attended 
the meeting. After discussion, the meeting ultimately adopted the Report on the Outcome of 
the Meeting of the Special Group to Review the Application of ICAO Treaties Relating to 
Conflict Zones, which would be forwarded to the ICAO Council. 
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IV. From State Aircraft to State Aviation Behaviors: 
      An Review of Existing Theories
As previously mentioned, we need to create a regime of state aviation 
behavior, which corresponds to the existing regime of state aircraft. The author 
attempts to start the discussion from the existing theories associated with state 
aircraft.   
A. ICAO
The ICAO was established with an aim24 to promote the development of 
civil aeronautics and cooperation in this regard. However, the attainment of this 
aim is conditioned on differentiating civil from state aircraft. Notably, ICAO is 
unauthorized to define state aircraft. Nevertheless, the organization has made some 
researches on the differentiation between civil and state aircraft. 
1. A Special Study on the Distinction Between Civil and State Aircraft
ICAO completed a study dedicated to the issue of civil/state aircraft,25 and 
prepared a working report for it. This report, in fact, analyzed civil and state 
aviation behaviors. It asserted that aircraft other than those used in military, 
customs and police services should be regarded as civil aircraft. However, it also 
stressed that multiple factors should be taken into account, when examining the 
nature of an aircraft. 
2. Incidentally Mentioned in the Discussion of Aircraft Operation 
In the ICAO Civil/Military Cooperation Symposium held on April 14 and 15, 
24   The aims and objectives of ICAO include: to ensure the safe and orderly growth of 
international civil aviation throughout the world; to encourage the arts of aircraft design and 
operation for peaceful purposes; to encourage the development of airways, airports and air 
navigation facilities for international civil aviation; to meet the needs of the peoples of the 
world for safe, regular, efficient and economical air transport; to prevent economic waste 
caused by unreasonable competition; to ensure that the rights of Contracting States are fully 
respected and that every Contracting State has a fair opportunity to operate international 
airlines; to avoid discrimination between Contracting States; to promote safety of flight 
in international air navigation; and to promote generally the development of all aspects of 
international civil aeronautics. 
25    Secretariat Study on “Civil/State Aircraft”, C-WP/9835 of 22/09/1993, presented by the 
Secretary General at the ICAO Council 140th Session.
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2015, when discussing about aircraft operation,26 ICAO believed that the Chicago 
Convention should be applicable only to civil aircraft, and should not be applicable 
to state aircraft. Also, the ICAO contended that aircraft used in military, customs 
and police services should be state aircraft. In other words, state aircraft should 
include but not limited to aircraft used in military, customs and police services, 
meaning that state aircraft can be used for more purposes than military, customs 
and police services. 
3. Incidentally Mentioned in the Discussion of Reduced Vertical 
Separation Minimum (RVSM)
RVSM is implemented to reduce the vertical separation between flight level 
(FL) 290 and FL 410 from 2000-ft minimum to 1000-ft minimum, during the cruise 
phase of modern civil jet aircraft. It increases airspace capacity and operation 
profits of airlines, and decreases the workload in air traffic control. And ICAO 
started to study the RVSM standard in the 1970s.
In January 2002, upon negotiations between the aviation authorities of the 
States concerned and the relevant international civil aviation organizations, and 
after 13 working meetings, it is agreed that RVSM would be implemented in the 
airspace over the SCS since 21 February 2002. Aircraft without RVSM approval 
should not fly over RVSM airspace, and must fly below FL 290.
When deliberating the issue of RVSM,27 ICAO mentioned incidentally to 
define state aircraft as aircraft used in military, customs and police services.
4. Incidentally Mentioned in the Discussion of 
Foreign Air Operator Validation and Surveillance
When reviewing issues relating to foreign air operator validation and surveil-
lance,28 ICAO also explained Article 3 of Chicago Convention. The organization 
26　 ICAO Global Provisions Regarding Aircraft Operations, ICAO Civil/Military Cooperation 
Symposium, Paris, France, 14-15 April 2015, at http://www.icao.int/RO_EURNAT/
Other%20Meetings%20Seminars%20and%20Workshops/ICAO%20Civil-Military%20
Cooperation%20Meetings/ICAO%20Civil-military%20Cooperation%20Symposium%20
2015/ICMCS%20PPT12.pdf, 24 November 2016.
27   George Firican, State Aircraft in RVSM Airspace, ICAO Civil/Military Coordination 
Workshop, Kiev Ukraine, 28-31 October 2013, at http://www.icao.int/RO_EURNAT/
Other%20Meetings%20Seminars%20and%20Workshops/ICAO%20Civil-Military%20
Cooperation%20Meetings/ICAO%20Civil-military%20Cooperation%20Seminar%202013/
Kiev%20day%201%20George%20Firican%20State%20Aircraft%20in%20RVSM%20
airspace.pdf, 24 November 2016.
28     Foreign Air Operator Validation & Surveillance Course, p. 7, at http://www.icao.int/safety/
implementation/library/a_icao_convention_annexes_related_to_fao_2009_07_r1.pdf, 24 
November 2016.
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argued that this convention should be applicable only to civil aircraft, but not 
applicable to state aircraft, and aircraft used in military, customs and police services 
should be deemed as state aircraft, rather than civil aircraft. This argument is 
consistent with the one raised by the ICAO when discussing aircraft operation.
B. International Air Transport Association (IATA)
IATA put forward, in the ICAO Civil/Military Cooperation Symposium held 
on 14-15 April 2015, that Chicago Convention shall be applicable only to civil 
aircraft, and shall not be applicable to state aircraft.29 The view of the IATA was 
identical with that of ICAO, which also attended the symposium, reflecting the 
common view shared by these two important organizations in this regard.  
C. European Aviation Safety Agency
European Aviation Safety Agency, in its Guidance Material for the Certifica-
tion and Operation of State Aircraft in European RVSM Airspace,30 said that “only” 
aircraft used in the military, customs and police services would qualify as State 
aircraft. Comparatively, neither Chicago Convention nor ICAO has used “only” to 
strictly define the concept of state aircraft. 
D. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
When discussing issues related to civil/military aircraft operating in support 
of NATO-led missions and operations,31 NATO argued that aircraft used in the 
military, customs and police services should be state aircraft, rather than civil 
29    Dmitry Kosolapov, Improve Safety for Flight over the High Seas, ICAO Civil/Military 
Cooperation Symposium, Paris, France, 14-15 April 2015, p. 4, at http://www.icao.int/
RO_EURNAT/Other%20Meetings%20Seminars%20and%20Workshops/ICAO%20Civil-
Military%20Cooperation%20Meetings/ICAO%20Civil-military%20Cooperation%20
Symposium%202015/ICMCS%20PPT07.pdf, 24 November 2016.
30     EUROCONTROL, Guidance Material for the Certification and Operation of State Aircraft 
in European RVSM Airspace, at https://www.eurocontrol.int/sites/default/files/article/
content/documents/official-documents/guidance/2012-cmac-rma-military-guidance.pdf, 24 
November 2016.
31   NATO Policy for Civil/Military Aircraft Operating in Support of NATO or NATO-
led Missions and Operations, at http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/
pdf_2016_08/20160804_1608-NATO-Policy-civil-military-aircraft.pdf, 24 November 2016.
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aircraft. NATO is consistent with both ICAO and IATA in this aspect. Furthermore, 
NATO also emphasized that when any contracting States issues other guidelines for 
state aircraft, due regard should be paid to the safety of civil aircraft. 
E. U.S. Air Force
In the ICAO’s RVSM Seminars for CAR/SAM Region, U.S. Air Force 
specifically talked about state aircraft issues. And it proposed that aircraft used in 
the military, customs and police services should be state aircraft, rather than civil 
aircraft. In addition, States have the freedom to define state aircraft, and should 
take into account the owner, operator, passengers, cargos and other factors when 
defining.32
F. Discussions over the Distinction between Civil and 
    State Aircraft in China
1. Academic Circles
In China, only a few academic papers have explored the distinction between 
civil and state aircraft. And these papers focus on the study and identification of 
state aircraft,33 which virtually discuss state aviation behaviors.  
2. Practitioner Circles
In Chinese practitioner circles, the Civil Aircraft Maintenance Certification 
Regulations (CAAC Decree No. 31) of 1993, provided that “state aircraft refer to 
the aircraft used in the military, customs and police services”. However, this decree 
was abolished and replaced by the 2001 Civil Aircraft Maintenance Organization 
Certification Regulations. Additionally, “state aircraft” was used solely as a notion 
without any precise textual meaning in the following rules or regulations: Rules 
on Air Traffic Control of China’s Civil Aviation,34 Civil Aviation Flight Dispatcher 
32    U.S. Air Force: State Aircraft Issues, ICAO’s 1st RVSM Seminar for CAR/SAM Region, 
ICAO’s 2nd RVSM Seminar for CAR/SAM Region, at http://www.icao.int/RO_SAM/
Documents/2003/RVSMII/P-Storm-State%20Aircraft-E.pdf#search=State%20Aircraft%20
%20%20us%20AIr%20force, 17 December 2016. 
33    Huang Lihua, Legal Problems about the State Aircrafts, Modern Law Science, No. 6, 2000, 
pp. 146~149 (in Chinese); Li Wenli, Position of State Aircraft in International Law, Journal 
of Anhui Vocational College of Police Officers, No. 3, 2003, pp. 26~27. (in Chinese)
34　  Rules on Air Traffic Control of China’s Civil Aviation (CAAC Order No. 86) was promul-
gated on 5 July 1999 and came into force on 5 January 2000.
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License Management Rules,35 A Guide to Flight Plan Application and Its Approval 
for Foreign Aircraft Interim Flight Operations during Olympic/Paralympic Games 
issued by CAAC,36 and Rules of Certification of Civil Aviation Aircraft Pilot and 
Ground Instructor.37 The CAAC Notice Concerning Issues Relating to the Carriage 
of Dangerous Goods Contained in Relief Supplies determined the nature of a single 
behavior, saying that “the carriage of relief supplies containing dangerous goods by 
chartering may be considered as carriage by state aircraft, and therefore not subject 
to Regulations CCAR-276. Nevertheless, the safe disposal of cargo shall be carried 
out pursuant to the requirements laid out in Article 2(2).” 
The preceding provisions show that the complete scope of state aircraft has not 
been defined by the practitioners. Currently, it is only partially described. 
G. Periodic Conclusion with Respect to the Differentiation 
     between Aircraft and Aviation Behavior
In the view of the author, the existing discussions on the distinction between 
civil and state aircraft have confused the nature of aircraft with that of aviation 
behavior. Therefore, the two concepts need to be clarified. 
Presently, most States and international organizations tend to include “aviation 
behaviors” into the concept of aircraft, which, however, may cause misjudgment 
of the actual behaviors of aircraft. For example, many incidents, happened in the 
history of global civil aviation, were caused by misjudging the behaviors of civil 
aircraft.
35　 Civil Aviation Flight Dispatcher License Management Rules (CAAC Order No. 136) was 
promulgated on 16 December 2004 and came into force on 15 January 2005.
36　  A Guide to Flight Plan Application and Its Approval for Foreign Aircraft Interim Flight 
Operations during Olympic/Paralympic Games, a telegraph issued by CAAC, was 
promulgated in February 2008 and came into force on 1 July 2008. 
37　  Rules of Certification of Civil Aviation Aircraft Pilot and Ground Instructor (CAAC Order 
No. 224) was promulgated on 10 July 2014 and came into force on 1 September 2014.
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Currently, some States have unreasonable views towards China’s entitlement 
to the SCS region. Against this backdrop, it is likely that the aircraft behaviors in 
the SCS airspace would be misjudged, because solely judging from the nature of 
aircraft cannot determine the behavior of an aircraft. Therefore, we need to study 
aircraft and aviation behaviors, and differentiate one from another, especially state 
aviation behaviors. 
1. The Nature of Aircraft
The nature of an aircraft is primarily determined on the basis of its original 
intended usage, but this usage does not prevent it from being used for other 
purposes in the future. And changes of aircraft nature really exist.38 In other words, 
the nature of aircraft is objective and may be changed. In that case, it is unscientific 
to decide aircraft behaviors solely from the nature of aircraft. For example, with 
respect to a civil aircraft performing certain state mission, the conclusion regarding 
the nature of its behavior would be contrary to the truth, if merely judging from the 
nature of the aircraft. 
2. Aviation Behaviors
With the development of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), stubbornly insisting 
on treating the nature of aircraft as a criterion has become meaningless, because the 
nature of aircraft, in fact, depends on its behavioral purposes. For instance, UAV 
can be used for express delivery, and also for the performance of military missions. 
The behaviors of UAV would be confused with each other, if UAV is treated in a 
uniform way as a key concept. The author argues, precisely because of the defects 
lying in the definition of the nature of aircraft, the nature of aviation activities 
becomes easier to be decided, which, specifically, should be decided by the actual 
38　 Boeing Makes the History of Converting Civil Aircraft into Military Aircraft, Beijing Daily, 
22 May 2007 (in Chinese). For example, Boeing 737-100 was originally developed as a 
short-range airliner with a capacity of 65~80 passengers. That is to say, Boeing 737-100 
was civil aircraft in nature. However, the development history of Boeing products tells, 
Boeing has developed large jet airliners including series 707, 737, 747, 757, 767 and 777, 
and series 787 is also developed and under trial production. In order to meet military needs, 
Boeing also converted its airliners into military aircraft. For instance, Boeing 707-320B 
was later converted into an early warning aircraft, which made its maiden flight in 1972; in 
November 2006, South Korea ordered four Boeing E-737 early warning aircraft, enabling 
South Korea to surveil the whole Korean Peninsula and some airspace of its neighboring 
States; in 1977, Boeing 747 was modified to ferry space shuttles, which has been used as 
shuttle carrier aircraft until now; Boeing KC-767 is an aerial refuelling tanker developed 
from Boeing 767, which can refuel a Boeing B-52H (a along-range, heavy strategic bomber) 
up in the air; in 1993, Japan became the primary user of Boeing 767 early warning aircraft, 
and four such aircraft have been put into service by now. 
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purpose of such activities. For example, a civil plane, Boeing 737-100, which was 
chartered by a State to do rescue and relief work, should be considered as carrying 
out state activities. It follows that aviation activities reflect the subjective nature of 
aircraft. 
3. From Aircraft to Aviation Behaviors
The statements above show, the nature of aircraft is not directly related to the 
nature of aviation activities. If aviation behaviors are classified merely based on 
the nature of aircraft, the actual purposes of aircraft would be ignored. However, 
such actual purposes, instead of the original intended usage of aircraft, should be 
the critical element distinguishing civil from state aviation behaviors. Currently, 
aircraft is defined in terms of the subjective criteria of aviation behaviors. In 
that case, the definition of state aircraft could be mutatis mutandis applied to the 
definition of state aviation behaviors. 
V. The Purposes of State Aviation Behaviors
As described above, the determination of the nature of aircraft cannot 
contribute to the settlement of problems happened in real life. Due to their 
behaviors, many civil aircraft were shot down as state aircraft. Such tragedies 
can serve as a perfect example in this case. Given that the definition made by the 
international community for civil aviation behavior is relatively precise and clear, 
the real problem that we have to tackle is how to determine or judge state aviation 
behaviors. 
A. The Right to Define State Aviation Behaviors
First, the UN Charter stipulates, in its Preamble, the determination “to 
reaffirm faith … in the equal rights … of nations large and small,” and in Article 
1 the purpose “to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for 
the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.” Particularly, the 
Charter provides: “The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign 
equality of all its Members” (Article 2, Paragraph 1); “Nothing contained in the 
present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are 
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State” (Article 2, Paragraph 7); 
and “relationship among [Members of the United Nations] shall be based on respect 
for the principle of sovereign equality” (Article 78). The principle of sovereign 
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equality, a fundamental organization principle of the United Nations, is listed as the 
most important one.
Second, according to Article 3(d) of the Chicago Convention, “[t]he contrac-
ting States undertake, when issuing regulations for their state aircraft, that they will 
have due regard for the safety of navigation of civil aircraft.” It shows, following 
the UN Charter, the Chicago Convention also provides for the respect to the 
sovereignty of all States, and acknowledges that a State has the freedom to define 
its state aircraft or state aviation behavior. 
Hence, both the principle of state sovereignty provided for in the UN Charter, 
and the freedom of States to define state aircraft or state aviation behavior 
contemplated in the Chicago Convention tell that, to provide for the definition 
and scope of state aircraft and state aviation behavior is a matter within a State’s 
sovereignty. Particularly, China should define state aviation behaviors, since the 
SCS region is the base supporting all the existing and future rights necessary for 
the maintenance of the sovereign relations between China’s mainland territory and 
its indispensable archipelagic waters, and for the development of the SCS islands.
B. The Differentiation Between Civil and State Aviation Behaviors
Article 3 of the Chicago Convention provides,
Civil and state aircraft 
a) This Convention shall be applicable only to civil aircraft, and shall not 
be applicable to state aircraft. 
b) Aircraft used in military, customs and police services shall be deemed 
to be state aircraft.
c) No state aircraft of a contracting State shall fly over the territory of 
another State or land thereon without authorization by special agreement or 
otherwise, and in accordance with the terms thereof. 
d) The contracting States undertake, when issuing regulations for their 
state aircraft, that they will have due regard for the safety of navigation of civil 
aircraft.
This article is considered as the one that has differentiated civil from state 
aircraft. 
First, the Preamble of Chicago Convention expressively provides, “… in order 
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that international civil aviation may be developed in a safe and orderly manner and 
that international air transport services may be established on the basis of equality 
of opportunity and operated soundly and economically. Have accordingly conclude 
this Convention to that end.” And Article 3 reaffirms, “This Convention shall be 
applicable only to civil aircraft, and shall not be applicable to state aircraft.” These 
provisions indicate that the definition and scope of state aviation behavior are 
not covered in the Chicago Convention. Therefore, the definition of state aircraft 
contained in this convention is meaningful and applicable only in cases of civil 
aviation behaviors. In other words, the distinction between civil and state aviation 
behaviors as envisioned in the Chicago Convention is made in relation to the 
purpose of this convention, which hence is not applicable in all cases. 
Second, semantically, the provision “[a]ircraft used in military, customs and 
police services shall be deemed to be state aircraft” (Chicago Convention, Article 
3) uses the sentence pattern of “… used in (purposes), should be (nature).” In that 
case, defining state aircraft is, actually, a process of depicting the nature of aircraft 
based on the nature of aviation behaviors.  
Third, Chicago Convention, Article 3, “aircraft used in military, customs and 
police services”, sets out its provision by enumerating all possible kinds of state 
aircraft. However, if we say the three kinds of aircraft listed above cover all state 
aircraft or all purposes of state aviation behaviors, the principle of state sovereignty 
under the UN Charter would be violated. Since all States enjoy equal sovereignty, 
and the purposes of state aviation behaviors are covered in state sovereignty, 
such purposes should not be subject to the definition contained in Article 3 of the 
Chicago Convention. 
Lastly, Chicago Convention, Article 3(d) states, “The contracting States 
undertake, when issuing regulations for their state aircraft, that they will have 
due regard for the safety of navigation of civil aircraft.” This article shows this 
convention respects state sovereignty, and all States have the freedom to prescribe 
what state aircraft or state aviation behaviors are in their own States. 
C. Civil Aviation Behaviors Defined in the Civil Aviation Law 
     of the People’s Republic of China
The Civil Aviation Law of the People’s Republic of China fails to directly 
define the term “state aircraft”. It only stipulates in Article 5, “Civil aircraft as 
referred to in this Law means aircraft other than those used in flight missions of 
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military, customs and police services”. However, the aim of this law is solely “to 
safeguard the national sovereignty of territorial airspace and the rights of civil 
aviation, to ensure the conduct of civil aviation activities in a safe and orderly 
manner, to protect the lawful rights and interests of the parties concerned in civil 
aviation activities, and to promote the development of civil aviation industry.” 
Therefore, Article 5, which is stated by enumeration, cannot be considered as a 
provision distinguishing civil aviation behavior from state aviation activities. This 
article may only be said to constitute a part of the definition of civil aircraft or civil 
aviation behavior. And the term of “civil aviation behavior” should be adequately 
defined by referring to the whole text and structure of the Civil Aviation Law of 
China and other laws or regulations.
In addition, Article 5 of the Civil Aviation Law of China, which was 
promulgated on 30 October 1995, to some extent, repeats the wording of the 
Chicago Convention Article 3, “Aircraft used in military, customs and police 
services shall be deemed to be state aircraft”. Consequently, this Article 5 does not 
have the full authority to differentiate state from civil aviation behaviors. 
D. State Aviation Behaviors Defined in the Constitution and 
    Property Law of the People’s Republic of China
The definition of state aviation behaviors should also be found in the 
Constitution and Property Law of the People’s Republic of China. Article 13 of the 
Constitution of China lays down some provisions about private property, saying: 
“The State may, in the public interest and in accordance with law, expropriate 
or requisition private property for its use and make compensation for the private 
property expropriated or requisitioned.” Furthermore, Article 44 of the Property 
Law of China prescribes, “In order to meet such urgent needs as rushing to 
rescue or providing disaster relief, the immovables or movables of any entities or 
individuals may be requisitioned within the limits of power and in compliance with 
the statutory procedures. After the emergent use, the requisitioned immovables 
or movables shall be returned to the owners. Where the immovables or movables 
of any entities or individuals are requisitioned, or if they are damaged or lost 
thereafter, compensations shall be made therefor.” 
That is to say, “in the public interest” or “in order to meet such urgent needs 
as rushing to rescue or providing disaster relief”, the State may expropriate or 
requisition private property for its use. In a similar vein, “in the public interest” 
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or “in order to meet such urgent needs as rushing to rescue or providing disaster 
relief”, the State may expropriate or requisition civil aircraft for its use, which in 
fact turns a civil aviation behavior into a state aviation behavior. 
E. Joint Determination
The analysis above shows that making regulations on the definition of state 
aviation behavior is a matter within the sovereignty of a State, and a sovereign 
State has indisputable power in this regard. If dichotomy (state and civil aviation 
behaviors) is used to define aviation activities, the purposes of state aviation 
behaviors involve, at least, the following three aspects: 
First, Article 5 of the Civil Aviation Law of China, “Civil aircraft as referred 
to in this Law means aircraft other than those used in flight missions of military, 
customs and police services”, defines civil aircraft by excluding all possible 
options, and at the meantime describes the purposes of non-civil aviation activities. 
Seen from the dichotomy of state and civil aviation behaviors, these purposes of 
non-civil aviation activities form a part of the purposes of state aviation behaviors. 
In the eye of positive law, to engage in “flight missions of military, customs and 
police services” is one of the purposes of state aviation behaviors.
Second, pursuant to the Constitution and the Property Law of China, “in 
the public interest” or “in order to meet such urgent needs as rushing to rescue 
or providing disaster relief”, the State may lawfully expropriate or requisition 
private property for its use. In real life, due to emergent disasters, the State 
would requisition civil aircraft to engage in some relief work, where civil aircraft 
activities have the nature of state aviation behaviors. In other words, according to 
the Constitution and the Property Law of China, performing state missions should 
become one of the purposes of state aviation behaviors. 
Lastly, in accordance with the principle of state sovereignty under the UN 
Charter, and the provision that States may define their own state aircraft or state 
aviation behaviors under the Chicago Convention, States have the freedom to 
supplement the definition of state aviation behaviors. 
To sum up, the purposes of state aviation behaviors include: to engage in “flight 
missions of military, customs and police services”, to meet “the public interest” 
and “to meet such urgent needs as rushing to rescue or providing disaster relief”. 
Additionally, States have the freedom to supplement the definition of state aviation 
behaviors.
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F. Nature of Aviation Activities When State and 
    Civil Aviation Behaviors Are Combined 
Where state and civil aviation behaviors are combined together, how 
to determine the nature of such aviation activities? For example, when law 
enforcement officers of a State, in accordance with a bilateral judicial agreement, 
take a fleeing criminal suspect handed over by the law-enforcement authority 
of another State, back to his home State by civil aviation flight, state activities 
(sending a criminal suspect under escort) and civil activities (ordinary passengers 
taking a plane) are combined together. In this case, how to define the nature of the 
activity of this aircraft? The author holds that this question should be answered 
based on the following standards.
Firstly, in order to define the nature of such aviation activities, we may look 
into whether the aircraft is primarily used for conducting civil or state activities. In 
the example mentioned above, if the flight is mainly used for carrying passengers, 
and the escorting of criminal suspect does not substantially affect the functions of 
the aircraft, then the aviation activity should be deemed as a civil aviation behavior; 
in contrast, if the civil aircraft, as required by the escorting mission, adopts special 
flight timetable and other means to ensure its navigation safety, then this aviation 
activity should be deemed as a state aviation behavior. Notably, with respect to 
an aircraft flying in the territorial air space of a State, the nature of its aviation 
behaviors should be decided in accordance with the laws of that State, which is a 
kind of respect to the sovereignty of the State concerned. Specifically, when the 
state aircraft of State A operate in the airspace of that State or the airspace over 
the high seas, they should comply with the domestic law of State A and the rules 
of international law; when the state aircraft of State A enter into the territorial air 
space of State B, they should be regulated by the domestic law of State B. 
Secondly, we may examine who de facto controls the aircraft. State aviation 
behaviors are not only reflected in their purposes, but also include some external 
behaviors. On the one hand, some civil aviation behaviors are mistaken as state 
ones due to certain external behaviors; most of the airliner shootdown incidents in 
history were caused by misunderstanding of external behaviors. On the other hand, 
there are cases where state aviation behaviors, because of external behaviors, are 
China Oceans Law Review (Vol. 2016 No. 2)220
mistaken as civil ones.39 
Lastly, we can also determine the nature of an aviation behavior through 
aircraft marks. Civil aircraft markings, referring to aircraft number, tail number and 
registration number, is a significant symbol used to identify aircraft. Without such 
unique numbers, civil aircraft are not allowed to engage in any flight. The ICAO 
Council first adopted Annex 7 “Aircraft Nationality and Registration Marks” to the 
Chicago Convention on 8 February 1949. And the fourth amendment to Annex 7 
was adopted on 30 July 1981. Contracting States are required to notify the ICAO 
of any differences between their national regulations and the standards contained 
in this Annex 7, and describe the differences in the appendices to Annex 7. Such 
standards actually set out some regulations on the identification of civil aviation 
behaviors both on national and international levels. Hence, in the international 
arena, we may determine the nature of an aviation behavior through relevant 
39    For example, Israeli air force carried out the “Operation Babylon” on 7 June 1981. It 
deployed 14 airplanes, launching a surprise strike against a nuclear reactor about 20 km 
southeast of the Iraqi capital Baghdad. Israel painted its attack squadron resembling the 
aircraft of Jordanian air force. When Saudi radar detected the Israeli aircraft and the 
controllers required the Israeli pilots to report their identities, the Israeli pilots replied in 
fluent Arabic: “We are Jordanian air force conducting routine trainings.” The controllers 
believed it to be true. When Jordan radar detected these aircraft, due to the density of the 
squadron, the image displayed on the radar screen was just a blurring dot, like a large 
transport aircraft. When enquired, the pilots answered in American English: “It is a civil 
plane”. The Israeli aircraft muddled through again.
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markings, including nationality,40 common41 and registration marks.42 
VI. Conclusions
The 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia and the 1982 
UNCLOS established the preliminary mechanism to peacefully settle the disputes 
in Southeast Asia. Unfortunately, this mechanism has not substantially contributed 
to the resolution of SCS disputes. In this context, China and ASEAN countries 
signed in 2002 the Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, which 
is the first political document specially designed to settle SCS disputes. 
As mentioned previously, in the current situation of global anti-terrorism, 
the notion of “aggression act” tends to expand its meaning, and impose new 
requirements on the identification of state aviation behaviors. The identification of 
state aviation behaviors, essentially, concerns the legality of state aircraft behaviors 
carried out in foreign and international airspace.
40　 Selection rule of nationality mark: the nationality mark shall be selected from the series of 
nationality symbols included in the radio call signs allocated to the State of Registry by 
the International Telecommunication Union. The nationality mark shall be notified to the 
International Civil Aviation Organization.
41　 The third amendment to Annex 7 was adopted by the ICAO on 23 January 1969, and 
entered into force on 23 May of the same year. The amendment introduced expressions such 
as “Common Mark”, “Common Mark Registering Authority” and “International Operating 
Agency”. In accordance with Article 77 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation, 
aircraft not registered on a national basis can apply for common marks. The common mark 
shall be selected from the series of symbols included in the radio call signs allocated to the 
ICOA by the International Telecommunication Union. Assignment of the common mark 
to a common mark registering authority will be made by the International Civil Aviation 
Organization. For example, the ICAO Council decision of 1983 required: the aircraft 
jointly registered by the Arab Air Cargo (cooperative between Iraq & Jordan) must bear 
the common mark “4YB”; joint register shall be maintained by Jordan; and Jordan & Iraq 
shall be jointly & severally bound to assume the obligations & responsibilities which ICAO 
attaches.
42　 Generally, “registration mark” shall be letters, numbers, or a combination of letters and 
numbers. The nationality mark shall precede the registration mark. When the first character 
of the registration mark is a letter, it shall be preceded by a hyphen. According to the 
Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on the Nationality Registration of Civil 
Aircraft, with respect to a civil aircraft having not obtained a civil aircraft nationality 
registration certificate, a provisional registration mark may be applied, when the aircraft 
is used in test flights, performance flights, orientation flights for export delivery (to be 
delivered in a foreign State), or in other circumstances considered necessary by the CAAC. 
Aircraft with provisional registration marks should not engage in passenger and cargo 
transportation, as well as other business operations. 
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A. Adhering to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence on the Whole
The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, as open and inclusive principles 
of international law, embody the values of sovereignty, justice, democracy and 
rule of law.43 These principles were also incorporated in the relevant declarations, 
such as the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations, adopted by the UN General Assembly at its 25th session in 1970, 
and the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, 
adopted at the sixth special session of UN General Assembly in 1974. Disputes and 
differences between countries should be resolved through dialogue, consultation 
and peaceful means. We should increase mutual trust, and settle disputes and 
promote security through dialogue. Willful threat or use of force are discouraged. 
Flexing military muscles only reveals the lack of moral ground or vision rather than 
reflecting one’s strength. Security can be solid and enduring only if it is based on 
moral high ground and vision. Therefore, these five principles should be employed 
as a general standard to deal with state aircraft behaviors performed in foreign and 
international airspace.
The SCS airspace is a part of the important base supporting China’s 
management and development of Dongsha, Zhongsha, Xisha and Nansha Islands 
as well as their adjacent waters. China’s entitlement to the SCS airspace should 
include, all the existing and future rights necessary for the development of these 
SCS islands, and for the maintenance of the sovereign relations between China’s 
mainland territory and its indispensable archipelagic waters. The freedom of 
navigation and overflight of other States should be without prejudice to China’s 
exercise of such rights. 
Overall, in order to use SCS airspace, China’s rights mentioned above should 
first be respected. In addition, the airspace should be used for peaceful development 
and win-win cooperation. 
43     Carry Forward the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence to Build a Better World through 
Win-win Cooperation, Address by H.E. Mr. Xi Jinping, President of the People’s Republic 
of China, at Meeting Marking the 60th Anniversary of the Initiation of the Five Principles 
of Peaceful Coexistence, at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/
t1170143.shtml, 24 November 2016.
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B. Double Standard to Define State Aviation Behaviors 
As stated above, given that States are authorized to define state aviation 
behavior, and international conventions are silent on the said behavior, currently, 
there is no concept of state aviation behavior widely acknowledged in the interna-
tional community. This situation makes the concept extensible. In this connection, 
when assessing whether a behavior is a state aviation behavior or not, or excluding 
the application of civil aviation conventions, the domestic law of the State 
concerned and the international law should be considered together. 
On the one hand, the right to evaluate and identify state aviation behaviors 
falls under the scope of sovereignty. In particular, with respect to foreign aircraft 
flying over the territorial airspace of a State, that sovereign State has indisputable 
power to assess their activities. On the other hand, when determining the nature 
of an aviation behavior, the existing rules of international law should be complied 
with first, but the regulations and practice of the States concerned should also be 
taken into account.
C. The Standard to Determine the Innocence of State Aviation Behaviors
State aviation behaviors, if carried out in foreign and international airspace, 
may cause conflicts of sovereignty. However, if a state aviation behavior does not 
jeopardize the sovereignty of another State, this behavior should not be deemed 
as a wrongful act. For example, where a state aviation behavior is performed 
in foreign and international airspace for relief work, it cannot be considered as 
wrongful. This point is recognized by the international law, since the wrongfulness 
of internationally wrongful acts is precluded in a situation of distress, which has 
long been established as a rule of customary international law. The International 
Law Commission, established by the United Nations General Assembly, adopted 
the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts at 
its fifty-third session in 2001. Article 24(1) of the Draft Articles provides that, “The 
wrongfulness of an act of a State not in conformity with an international obligation 
of that State is precluded if the author of the act in question has no other reasonable 
way, in a situation of distress, of saving the author’s life or the lives of other 
persons entrusted to the author’s care.”
State aviation behaviors carried out in the SCS airspace should not undermine 
the sovereign relations between China’s mainland territory and its SCS islands, or 
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the support offered by the waters enclosed by the U-shaped line to such relations. 
That is to say, in the SCS region, state aviation behaviors should be performed 
according to this supreme principle, which derives from the principle of state 
sovereignty under modern international law. When any State utilizes a region that 
another State relies on for existence, it should not infringe the sovereignty of that 
State.
D. The Standard of Excluding Reasonable Doubts
The standard of excluding reasonable doubts is a standard applied in criminal 
procedure law to judge whether a suspect is guilty or innocent. This standard can 
also be applied to judge whether a state aviation behavior performed in foreign and 
international airspace is wrongful or not. That is to say, in procedure, a State cannot 
decide the wrongfulness of such a state aviation behavior before excluding all 
reasonable doubts.
As previously mentioned, when the state aircraft of State A operate in the 
airspace of that State or the airspace over the high seas, they should comply with 
the domestic law of State A and the rules of international law; when the state 
aircraft of State A enter into the territorial air space of State B, they should be 
regulated by the domestic law of State B. Therefore, it is highly possible that 
the two States would have different or even conflicting regulations about the 
identification of aviation behaviors. Currently, it is unrealistic to find a uniform 
standard from international law in this regard. In this context, we need to collate 
the existing standards, especially those concerning “innocence”.
China, a State with preferential rights to the SCS airspace, has duties of 
prudence and care under procedural law. SCS serves as a vital transportation hub. 
Being aware of the significance of SCS region to all States, China actively proposes 
to shape a normative order in the region through the Declaration on the Conduct of 
Parties in the South China Sea, with an aim to increase the public benefits derived 
from the SCS region.
E. The Principle of Not Resorting to Force First
States have the right to self-defence in cases of aggression or terrorist attacks. 
Nonetheless, force cannot be used, unless state aircraft behaviors performed in 
foreign and international airspace are determined as acts of aggression. When 
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deciding whether an act constitutes an act of aggression or not, restrictive interpre-
tation should be applied in principle, but extensive interpretation may also be 
used, if necessary, against the backdrop of anti-terrorism. The Declaration on the 
Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea emphasizes that “[t]he Parties concerned 
undertake to resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means, 
without resorting to the threat or use of force, through friendly consultations and 
negotiations by sovereign States directly concerned, in accordance with universally 
recognized principles of international law, including the 1982 UN Convention on 
the Law of the Sea.”
Therefore, if the state aviation behaviors of any other States performed in the 
SCS airspace prejudice the sovereign relations between China’s mainland territory 
and its SCS islands, it should be settled first through consultation and negotiations.  
Translator: XIE Hongyue
